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NOTES
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN "DISABLING" AND
"ENABLING" PARADIGMS IN LAW:
STERILIZATION, THE DEVELOPMENTALLY
DISABLED, AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith and reasoned
judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But in
the everyday business of living... these variant aspects of person-
ality find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They cannot
be altogether parted in law more than in life.1
Although America has recorded great progress in the area of disa-
bility during the past few decades, our society is still infected by
the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that people
with disabilities are less than fully human... the result is massive,
society-wide discrimination. 2
INTRODUCnON
Traditionally, the law's policy regarding individuals with devel-
opmental disabilities has been one of pessimism.3 It has sought to
lessen the social impact of their disabilities through remedial meas-
I Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
2 The Americans With Disabilities Act: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on
Select Education and the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1989) (statement ofJustin Dart, Chairperson of the
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities).
3 Many legislatures, courts, and health professionals now use the term "develop-
mentally disabled" when referring to the mentally retarded. William A. Krais, Note, The
Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's Right of Self-Determination: Right-to-Die, Steriliza-
tion and Institutionalization, 15 AM.J.L. & MED. 333, 333 n.1 (1990). This Note uses the
terms "developmentally disabled" and "mentally disabled" interchangeably, with the
caveat that definitional problems may arise from this usage. For example, "[t]he Ameri-
can Association of Mental Deficiency defines mental retardation as 'subaverage general
intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental period and is associ-
ated with impairment in adaptive behavior.'" Id. (citation ommitted). However, the
precise legal meaning of "developmental disability" may be considerably narrower. 42
U.S.C.A. § 6001(5) (West Supp. 1992) provides this definition:
The term "developmental disability" means a severe, chronic disability of
a person 5 years of age or older which-
(A) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combina-
tion of mental and physical impairments;
(B) is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two;
(C) is likely to continue indefinitely;
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ures but has not generally assisted them in leading fuller, more
meaningful lives. 4 Within the last few decades, however, there has
been a perceptible change in the law's approach to developmental
disability; the underlying policy has shifted from negative expecta-
tion to "normalization." 5 This new approach is based on clinical
psychology's changing conception of developmental disability, 6
from a treatment paradigm focused on the "different" needs of the
disabled 7 to one that, in theory at least, assumes that their disabili-
ties are more dynamic and flexible than was previously thought.8
The social ramifications of this shift are unclear, but its legal
consequences are already visible. Congress and state legislatures
have taken increasingly active roles in encouraging the normaliza-
tion of the disabled, as witnessed by a proliferation of statutory
(D) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of
the following areas of major life activity: (i) self-care, (ii) receptive
and expressive language, (iii) learning, (iv) mobility, (v) self-direc-
tion, (vi) capacity for independent living, and (vii) economic self-suf-
ficiency; and
(E) reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of
special, interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other serv-
ices which are of lifelong or extended duration and are individually
planned and coordinated ....
Id.; see Philip Roos, The Law and Mentally Retarded People: An Uncertain Future 31 STAN. L.
REV. 613 (1979); Deborah H. Ross, Sterilization of the Developmentally Disabled Shedding
Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 599 (1981).
4 See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions ofJustice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Re-
tarded Parent 103 HARv. L. REV. 1201 (1990).
5 Recognizing that treating retarded people as "deviant" only reinforces
"deviant" behavior, many leaders in the field of mental retardation have
urged that retarded people be treated as much as possible like normal
people, that they be afforded "patterns and conditions of everyday life
which are as close as possible to the norms and patterns of the main-
stream of society."
Roos, supra note 4, at 613-14 (citation omitted). Normalization was first seen as an end
in itself, but more recently has been invoked as a means of fostering normative behavior.
See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Mental Retardation and Society: The Ethics and Politics of
Normalization, 93 ETHICS 81 (1982) (discussing the political and clinical foundations of
"normalization" policy and the difficulty of putting it into practical effect).
6 Recognition of the receptivity of many mentally disabled persons to education
and training has formed the basis for the most recent response model, the developmen-
tal approach. First articulated in the 1960s, this approach has made tremendous inroads
into the traditional methods of dealing with mental disability. The emphasis of this ap-
proach is on teaching and training the disabled, thus allowing them to acheive their full
developmental potential. SamuelJ. Brakel, Historical Trends, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 9, 17 (SamuelJ. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
7 See Philip Roos, Psychological Impact of Sterilization on the Individual, 1 LAw &
PSYCHOL. REV. 45 (1975).
8 See, e.g.,JANE R. MERCER, LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1973); William G.
Bronston, Concepts and Theory of Normalization, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD AND
His FAMILY 490 (Richard Koch &James C. Dobson eds., rev. ed. 1976); Roos, supra note
3; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5.
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schemes prohibiting discrimination against them.9 With the passage
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 10 the stage is
set for society-wide implementation of the normalization program-
yet the question remains whether the legal implementation of this
program will have any significant social impact. 1 An important as-
pect of this question is how the new body of law implementing nor-
malization policies will affect traditional legal conceptions of
disability.12
This Note suggests that alternative policies concerning the de-
velopmentally disabled conflict in an area of law that has tradition-
ally been rife with prejudice: involuntary sterilization.' 3 Part I of
this Note discusses the changing therapeutic and legal approaches
to disability. 14 Crudely speaking, the clinical paradigm has gone
from a "natural" to a "nurtural" interpretation of disability' 5-la-
belled herein, respectively, "disabling" and "enabling" paradigms 16
of disability.' 7 Along with a shift in the clinical approach to disabil-
9 See e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988); Education of
the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992). In addition, 34 states have enacted
their own anti-discrimination statutes. See John Parry, Rights and Entitlements in the Com-
munity, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 6, at 687-88.
10 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
11 See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA,
18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 340 (1990) ("[The ADA] is a monumental bill that
goes far in new directions. But it does not complete the voyage.").
12 See generally Hayman, supra note 4, at 1210 ("[Laws seeking to minimize the dam-
age mentally retarded persons cause to society] are nearly always inconsistent with
measures designed to eliminate the impacts of socio-political prejudice.").
13 This Note will focus on involuntary sterilization as authorized by statute. Very
broadly, involuntary sterilization statutes authorize the sterilization of mentally retarded
or generally incompetent persons without their consent. Cf Barbara A. Burnett, Volun-
tary Sterilization for Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Need for Legislation, 32 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 913, 914 (1981) ("Where informed consent of the patient cannot be obtained or
may be compromised, some provision for substituted consent must be made if the pro-
cedure is to be performed.").
For historical accounts of involuntary sterilizations, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. &
Marcia P. Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of
Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995 (1977); Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No
Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985).
14 Cf. MICHAEL WERTHEIMER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY (1970) (discussing
the emergence and growth of experimentalism in psychology); Philip Roos & Brian M.
McCann, Major Trends in Mental Retardation, 6 INT'LJ. MENTAL HEALTH 3 (1977) (discuss-
ing changing paradigms of mental disability).
15 The use of these rather well-worn terms represents the shift in prevailing thera-
peutic approaches, a shift that emphasizes deinstitutionalization and community-based
systems of support and treatment. For discussion, see WOLF WOLFENSBERGER ET AL.,
THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES (1972).
16 This term is used with all due respect to Thomas Kuhn, who formulated the
concept of "paradigm shifts" in THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLU-
TIONS (2d ed. 1970).
17 Although these terms have unavoidable political connotations, the use of "en-
abling" and "disabling" is normative and is meant to characterize the poles of scientific
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ity has come a shift in the legal approach-from a containment re-
gime designed to administer services s to a normalization regime
constructed from statutory rights.19
Part II of this Note provides the legal and social history of in-
voluntary sterilization in the United States as a means to regulate
the developmentally disabled's ability to reproduce. Currently, the
legal regulation of sterilization is undergoing a crisis of faith,20 with
competing paradigms of disability creating tension in the law. This
tension results from widely varying levels of protection available for
the reproductive autonomy of developmentally disabled persons. 21
This Note then argues that the law's approach to sterilization of
the developmentally disabled should be enabling. Lawmakers in-
tent on regulating the procreative ability of the disabled should be
wary of over-generalizations about what such persons can or cannot
do.22 Policies of normalization 23 and constitutional due process
protections on the fundamental right to "bear and beget a child" 24
mandate maximally protective sterilization statutes. These policies
and legal debate. The term "disabling paradigm" is not intended to suggest that hold-
ers of this view are responsible for the persistence of developmental disability and its
societal effects; likewise, holders of the enabling view do not banish disability by ineffa-
ble optimism. Adherents to the enabling view, however, are much more willing to be-
lieve that behaviorial modifications reinforced by law may alter the social effects of
disability in a positive way.
18 Actually, this approach is still the norm in many contexts. See, e.g., Hayman, supra
note 4, at 1210-11 (discussing "redemptive" measures in retardation law, which are
"designed to limit, rather than maximize, [the retarded's] niche in the social order").
19 See generally Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989
U. Iu.. L. REV. 923 (discussing the recently enacted statute prohibiting discrimination in
employment, public services, and public accomodations); Judith W. Wegner, The Antidis-
crimination Model Reconsidered- Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1984) (discussing the
growing body of law interpreting a federal statute prohibiting discrimination among re-
cipients of federal funds).
20 See Burnett, supra note 13, at 916.
21 Id. at 924-25.
22 See Richard K. Sherlock & Robert D. Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded Constitu-
tional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C. L. REV. 943, 978 (1982) ("Especially at the
higher I.Q. end of the retardation spectrum, one might find individuals labeled retarded
who are capable of understanding the significance of sterilization .... [When individuals
can understand] the meaning of sterilization for themselves, we see no reason to deem
them incompetent to make the decision for themselves.").
23 See Roos, supra note 7, at 53
(One of the major concerns of many retarded persons is their desire to
'pass for normal,' but sterilization tends to interfere with this attempt,
particularly when the individual plans to marry. Hence it may well in-
crease the retarded person's reluctance to join the 'mainstream of soci-
ety' and to foster withdrawal and isolation.)
Id. (citation omitted). But see Burnett, supra note 13, at 923.
24 See Ross, supra note 3, at 609-30. See generally Rex Dunn, Eugenic Sterilization Stat-
utes: A Constitutional Re-evaluation 14J. FAM. L. 280 (1975) (subjecting involuntary sterili-
zation statutes to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection analysis).
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suggest that laws infringing on the developmentally disabled's pro-
creative ability should do so only when necessary for their well-
being.25
Unfortunately, minimally protective sterilization statutes were
upheld as constitutional decades ago in Buck v. Bell,26 an infamous
decision that seems unlikely to be overruled in the near future.
Thus, Part III of this Note suggests that the ADA27 should be used
to encourage the adoption of uniformly rigorous protections for de-
velopmentally disabled persons against state-mandated
sterilization. 28
I
A SHIFTING PARADIGM OF DISABILITY AND rrs LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES
A. The "Disabling" Paradigm
Historically, the developmentally disabled have borne the brunt
of much fear and prejudice and have been singled out for special
treatment. 29 This treatment has varied from their enshrinement as
"holy innocents" 0 to systematic attempts to eradicate their propa-
gation through forced sterilizations.8 ' However different the treat-
ment, the underlying perception has remained consistent: the
developmentally disabled are fundamentally different from the rest
of society-so different that they cannot exist in the community
25 See Ross, supra note 3, at 635-37; Richard A. Estaco, Comment, Sterilization of the
Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: Three Generations Without Legislative Guidance are Enough, 92
DICK. L. REv. 409 (1988).
26 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For discussion, see infra notes 87-100 and accompanying
text.
27 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
28 See infra part III.B.
29 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (1965) (discussing the phe-
nomenology of mental disability); see also Marie Appleby, Note, The Mentally Retarded:
The Needfor Intermnediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 109, 112-13 (1987) (discussing
the historical trend of misunderstanding mental retardation).
30 See Patricia Werner, Comment, Terminating the Rights of Mentally Retarded Parents:
Severing the Ties that Bind, 22J. MARSHALL L. REV. 133, 137 (1988).
Depictions of the "holy innocent" stereotype are common in world literature, rang-
ing from Prince Myshkin in FYODOR DosToYEvsKY, THE IDIOT (Constance Garnett trans.,
1913) to Ben Compton in WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND THE FURY (1929).
31 Forced sterilization of the developmentally disabled reached its height during
the 1930s in two modern industrial societies-Nazi Germany and the United States.
Similarities between their methods have been noted in James B. O'Hara & T. Howland
Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. LJ. 20, 31, 36-37 (1956).
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without assistance.3 2 Indeed, such persons are often deemed unable
to exist in the community at all. 33
Requirements of different treatment and the prevalence of neg-
ative expectations have led to a paradigm of disability that one may
label "disabling." 3 4 This paradigm reflects the presumption that
one who has been diagnosed as disabled in some important func-
tional way is unable to live in the community as a normal person and
therefore must receive special treatment. This presumption may, in
many cases, be correct. Too often, however, it may serve as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, especially since those who employ it assume,
often without justification, that the retarded are irremediably differ-
ent from others.35
This presumption, combined with imperfectly understood prin-
ciples of genetics3 6 and advances in medical sterilization proce-
dures,3 7 led to a brief period of popularity for eugenic sterilizations
in the early decades of this century.38 The premise behind eugenic
sterilization was a progressive, social Darwinistic desire to better the
human race through the sterilization of those with congenital and
behavioral abnormalities that were thought to be genetically trans-
mitted.39 The study of eugenics never rose above the level of a
pseudo-science because of wide gaps in knowledge about how ge-
32 See Thomas K. Gilhool, The Right to Community Services, in THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 172 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976). See generally Nor-
man R. Ellis, Issues in Mental Retardation, 1 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 9 (1975) (discussing
various therapeutic approaches to mental retardation).
33 See Jo Ann Chandler & Sterling Ross, Jr., Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in
the Community, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 32, at 305.
34 See supra notes 16-17.
35 A dated version of this view is provided by psychologist Henry H. Goddard's
empirical study of the geneology of the Kallikak family, in which he offers the following
assessment:
Feeblemindedness is hereditary and transmitted as surely as any other
character. We cannot successfully cope with [social deviancy] until we
recognize feeble-mindedness and its hereditary nature....
In considering the question of care, segregation through coloniza-
tion seems in the present state of our knowledge to be the ideal and per-
fectly satisfactory method.
HENRY H. GODDARD, THE KAALuKAg FAMILY 117 (1912).
36 Specifically, the dominant model was one of Mendelian genetic inheritance. The
ability of such a model to explain the appearance of retardation has since been widely
questioned. See RobertJ. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1418 (1981); Dunn, supra note 24, at 284-87.
37 See Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1429-30.
38 See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13; Cynkar, supra note 36; Dunn, supra note
25; and Lombardo, supra note 13.
39 See HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1922)
(written from the point of view of a contemporary advocate of eugenic sterilization);
George T. Skinner, Note, A Sterilization Statute for Kentucky?, 23 Ky. LJ. 168 (1934).
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netics actually worked. 40 The legal ramifications of the eugenics
movement, however, have proved much more durable.4 1
Similarly, other areas of the law that intersect with mental disa-
bility, such as adoption 42 and marriage,43 are highly receptive to the
disabling paradigm. 44 For example, despite the Supreme Court's
enunciation of a protected right to keep a child that one has "sired
and raised,"' 45 over forty states do not require parental consent to
adoption if a parent is "incompetent." 46 Only a few states require
notice to an incompetent parent or a hearing before a decision is
made.4 7 Likewise, despite the Court's declaration that "[m]arriage
is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very exis-
tence and survival," 48 over forty states restrict the marital rights of
"imbeciles," individuals "under guardianship," "mental retar-
dates," the "feebleminded," and so on.49 Such laws are disabling in
nature because they adopt the view that disability equals incapabil-
ity. Furthermore, by forgoing individualized determinations in
favor of blanket presumptions, they legitimize prejudice against the
developmentally disabled.
B. The "Enabling" Paradigm
Like the disabling paradigm, the enabling paradigm originated
in a medical and legal conception of disability. 50 In contrast to the
precautionary nature of the disabling paradigm, "the enabling para-
digm represents the more optimistic and dynamic view of a disabled
person's capabilities. In fact, holders of the enabling view typically
believe that negative expectations are partially responsible for the
debilitating effects of many disabilities. 5 1
40 The impulse behind eugenics has also been criticized as fundamentally isolation-
ist, xenophobic, and totalitarian. See Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1432.
41 See infra part II.A.
42 See Patricia M. Wald, The Legal Rights of People with Mental Disabilities in the Commu-
nity: A Plea for Laissez Faire, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1033,
1061 (BruceJ. Ennis et al. eds., 1973).
43 Id. at 1044.
44 See generally Randy A. Hertz, Note, Retarded Parents in Neglect Proceedings: The Erro-
neous Assumption of Parental Inadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REV. 785 (1979) (discussing sterotypi-
cal presumptions underlying restrictive adoption laws).
45 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
46 Wald, supra note 42, at 1061.
47 Id. at 1061-62.
48 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 112 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)).
49 Wald, supra note 42, at 1044.
50 Some of the general characteristics that this Note refers to as the "enabling"
paradigm in the therapeutic/psychology setting are set forth in Roos, supra note 3, at
613-15.
51 See Hertz, supra note 44; cf Hayman, supra note 4, at 1244-45 (discussing.the
"helplessness-condoning" effect of negative expectations).
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The source of the enabling paradigm is difficult to pinpoint, but
it appears to have originated both in widespread dissatisfaction over
the predictive validity of diagnostic tests used to determine the se-
verity of mental disability52 and in an increased awareness of the
great influence that environmental factors may exert on the devel-
opmentally disabled's quality of life. 53 However this paradigm shift
originated, the perception that the developmentally disabled are be-
yond the hope of a "normal" life has undergone drastic revision in
the course of this century. At present, the dominant view is that
one's surroundings can greatly alter the impact of developmental
disability on one's potential for a normal life. 54
The enabling view is the impetus behind therapeutic devices
such as community care centers for the disabled.5 5 The expectation
behind such centers is that care programs exposing residents to the
daily life of the community can alleviate the damaging effects of
mental disability. 56 While these programs have encountered vary-
ing degrees of success and much community opposition,57 they do
provide a more beneficial and stimulating atmosphere than the
highly restrictive and artificial environment at a typical state mental
institution. 58
The enabling paradigm has likewise found forceful expression
in the legal sphere, largely because of the therapeutic revolution dis-
cussed above 59 and the civil rights movement of the 1960s. 60 The
atmosphere of politicalization among traditionally powerless minor-
ity groups, including the disabled, 61 led to the creation of disability
52 See Hayman, supra note 4, at 1213-16; Michael S. Sorgen, Labeling and Classifica-
tion, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 32, at 214.
53 Roos, supra note 3; Hayman, supra note 4, at 1213-16.
54 See Thomas K. Gilhool, supra note 32, at 179-80.
55 See generally id. at 173-82 (changing assumptions about the retarded's ability to
benefit from community services justifies legal protection of those services).
56 Chandler & Ross, supra note 33, at 310.
57 Id.; see also Laura L. Robinson, Note, The Controversy over Community Residences for
the Mentally Retarded, 13 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 119 (1989) (examining social and legal
issues with a view towards possible solutions). The debate surrounding community care
for the retarded has engendered numerous suits, one of which resulted in a controver-
sial Supreme Court decision, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432
(1985); see discussion infra notes 197-213 and accompanying text.
58 Cf Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 6, at 251 (examining legal protections afforded the insti-
tutionalized); Barbara A. Weiner, Treatment Rights, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAw, supra note 6, at 327 (discussing treatment of the mentally disabled in state
institutions).
59 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
60 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAw § 1.02 (1989).
61 The disabled have been recognized as a minority. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES OF HANDICAPPED AMS: PUB. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 29
(1980).
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law advocacy projects. These projects have served as sources of
funding for litigation as well as clearinghouses for information on
the growing legal rights of the disabled.62
Likewise, legal manifestations of the civil rights movement,
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,63 helped lay the groundwork at
a national level for codifying the rights of the disabled.64 In the wake
of federal action many states amended their antidiscrimination stat-
utes to cover discriminatory acts against the disabled.65 This legisla-
tive activity resulted in the creation of statutorily imposed mandates
to adopt an enabling view of the disabled in certain contexts, such as
education, 66 employment, 67 and the provision of public services.6 8
One must recognize however, that the legally enabling view of
the disabled fundamentally differs from the disabling view that has
traditionally dominated the law.69 The recent passage of the ADA 70
only exacerbates this tension. The remainder of this Note demon-
strates the potential difficulties that may result from the co-existence
of these polar conceptions of disability by focusing on the legal is-
sues involved in state mandated sterilization of the developmentally
disabled. 7'
62 See What is the Mental Health Law Project?, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
HANDICAPPED, supra note 42, at 1517.
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1988).
64 Cf PERLIN, supra note 60 (discussing the genesis of disability discrimination
laws).
65 See John Parry, Decision-making Rights Over Persons and Property, in THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 687-88. Note, however, the state legislation in
some cases actually produced federal legislation, at least in the area of education. Id. at
634.
66 Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
67 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
68 Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
146, 101 Stat. 840 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C.).
69 See Hayman, supra note 4, at 1210 (arguing that laws placing society's interests
before the retarded's are nearly always inconsistent with laws emphasizing
normalization).
70 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
71 The current poles of debate involve, on the one hand, the view that the develop-
mentally disabled should preferably never be subject to involuntary sterilization, Ross,
supra note 3, at 643, and on the other hand, the view that sterilization is a family decision
akin to a protected privacy right, and that family members should be allowed to make
the sterilization decision with minimal degrees of interference from the state. See gener-
ally Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Fam-
ily Privacy, 1986 DuxE LJ. 806.
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II
STERILIZATION OF THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED: AN
ARENA OF CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES
A. The Eugenic Enterprise: Sterilization in the United States
Reproductive control of the disabled is not a new idea. 72 Invol-
untary sterilization as a widespread phenomenon in the United
States dates from the early decades of this century, when steriliza-
tion statutes were passed en masse by state legislatures 73 under the
influence of progressive politics and the pseudo-science of eugen-
ics. 74 The discipline of eugenics, strongly influenced by social Dar-
winism, claimed as its goal the betterment of the human race
through the study and classification of genetic traits, establishing in
the process a ranking of desirable and undesirable traits for human
propagation.7 5
According to the eugenicists, retardation was a remediable so-
cial evil that could be genetically isolated and effectively neutralized
through the sterilization of those who were obviously afflicted.7 6
Despite the questionable scientific basis for this assertion,77 sterili-
zation of the developmentally disabled captured the legislative im-
agination. This was partly due to the well-organized and politically
effective lobbying groups that espoused the cause to various state
legislatures. 78 Such legislation also became popular as a cost-saving
device: these statutes typically provided for the discharge of the
sterilized person from state custodial care, thus saving the state the
expense of full-time care for that person, as well as for any possible
offspring.79
72 Eugenic breeding was advocated at least as early as Plato. See Cynkar, supra note
36, at 1432 n.63.
73 The first sterilization statute was enacted in Indiana in 1907. By 1925, twenty-
three states had passed such laws. Id. at 1433.
74 The following defines eugenics:
Derived from the Greek word meaning "well-born," the term eugenics
was coined by Sir Francis Galton in 1883 who defined it as "the study of
agencies under social control that may improve or impair... future gen-
erations either physically or mentally."
Estacio, supra note 25, at 91-92.
75 See Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1428.
76 See id at 1429.
77 See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1008; Elyce Z. Ferster, Eliminating the
Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIo ST. LJ. 591, 604 (1966) ("In short, the present
state of our scientific knowledge does not justify the widespread use of the sterilization
procedures in mentally ill or mentally deficient persons .... (testimony of Dr. Bernard
L. Diamond, special consultant to the American Psychiatric Association)).
78 For a fascinating account of political and scientific figures working behind the
scenes to get Virginia's eugenic sterilization law passed, see Cynkar, supra note 36, at
1435-40.
79 Cf Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1014-15 (discussing fiscal considera-
tions behind state-sanctioned sterilization).
516 [Vol. 78:507
1993] NOTE-DISABLING AND ENABLING PARADIGMS 517
These factors spurred legislatures into passing statutes that al-
lowed either the superintendent of a custodial care institution or a
guardian to consent to sterilization of the disabled person.80 Be-
cause it was often the guardian who decided to sterilize in the first
place, consent was rarely denied.8 1 Courts initially reacted with hos-
tility to this legislation.8 2 Frequently the statutes, many of which
lacked effective limits on the decisionmaker's discretion, were struck
down as unconstitutional.8 3 Many courts held that the statutes vio-
lated either due process, by failing to provide a hearing prior to
sterilization,8 4 or equal protection, by affecting only disabled per-
sons in institutions.8 5
In reaction to these adverse rulings, some state legislatures
amended their statutes to require a formal hearing before authoriz-
ing the operation.86 However, in the case of Buck v. Bell,8 7 the
Supreme Court settled the questions of substantive due process and
80 A representative example of this type of statute is Virginia's sterilization statute,
now repealed:
Whereas, both the health of the individual patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental
defectives under careful safeguard and by competent and contientious
authority, and
Whereas, such sterilization may be effected in males by the operation
of vasectomy and in females by the operation of salpingectomy, both of
which said operations may be performed without serious pain or substan-
tial danger to the life of the patient, and
Whereas, the Commonwealth has in custodial care and is supporting
in various State institutions many defective persons who if now dis-
charged or paroled would likely become by the propagation of their kind
a menace to society but who if incapable of procreating might properly
and safely be discharged or paroled and become self-supporting with
benefit both to themselves and to society, and
Whereas, human experience has demonstrated that heredity plays an
important part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy
and crime, now, therefore
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That whenever
the superintendent of [a state mental institution] shall be of the opinion
that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society that any in-
mate of the institution under his care should be sexually sterilized, such
superintendent is hereby authorized to perform, or cause to be per-
formed by some capable physician or surgeon, the operation of steriliza-
tion on any such patient confined in such institution ....
Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 394, 1924 Va. Acts 569 (repealed 1968).
81 By 1973, over 50,000 sterilization operations had been performed. See Wald,
supra note 42, at 1055.
82 Burgdorf& Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1000-01.
83 See, e.g., Brewer v. Valk, 167 S.E. 638 (N.C. 1933).
84 See, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921).
85 See Haynes v. Lapeer, 166 N.W. 938 (Mich. 1918); Smith v. Board of Examiners
of Feeble-Minded 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913).
86 See generally Richard K. Sherlock & Robert D. Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded- Con-
stitutional, Statutoy and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C. L. REv. 943, 945 (1982).
87 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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equal protection scrutiny for the developmentally disabled and revi-
talized the eugenic sterilization movement with one stroke.88
The statute at issue in Buck 8 9 allowed the superintendent of a
mental health institution to petition for the sterilization of residents
suffering from hereditary mental defects. 90 At the superintendent's
discretion, the petition could be brought before the institution's
board of directors. The only limitations upon the board's decision
were the statutory directions that sterilization be in the best inter-
ests of society and that the operation be performed "without detri-
ment to [the] general health" of the developmentally disabled
person.91 Procedurally, the statute allowed for the appointment of a
guardian to represent the resident's interests at a pre-decision hear-
ing and provided for a review of the Board's decision by the state
appellate courts.92
While these procedural protections effectively nullified the
threat of procedural due process challenges, 93 the question re-
mained whether involuntary sterilization statutes could be struck
down for substantive reasons.94 In rejecting the claim that the stat-
ute was an impermissible exercise of authority unjustified by the
vague "best interests of society" standard, the Supreme Court deliv-
ered an especially abrasive opinion,95 indicating the dominance of
the disabling paradigm at that time.96
Noting that the state's interest in preserving the public welfare
occasionally justified sacrificing the lives of our "best citizens," the
Court opined: "[i]t would be strange if [the state] could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
sacrifices.., in order to prevent our being swamped with incompe-
tence."' 97 In other words, the privacy interests of the disabled are
88 See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1001.
89 Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 394, 1924 Va. Acts 569 (repealed 1968).
90 274 U.S. at 206.
91 See supra note 80 (quoting portions of the Virginia sterilization statute).
92 274 U.S. at 206.
93 Id. at 207. In writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated that:
There can be no doubt that so far as procedure is concerned the lights of
the patient are most carefully considered, and as every step in this case
was taken in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after months of
observation, there is no doubt that in that respect the plaintiff in error has
had due process of law.
Id
94 Id.
95 Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1006-07.
96 Justice Holmes, author of the majority opinion in Buck v. Bell, was a noted sup-
porter of the eugenics movement. At that time, several members of the Court ascribed
to the Social Darwinist views that so strongly influenced the eugenics movement.
Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1451.
97 274 U.S. at 207.
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accorded little weight in comparison to the state's interest in regu-
lating their procreation.
One's acceptance of this result depends upon how highly one
values reproductive privacy rights for the developmentally disabled.
For example, one may generally favor reproductive privacy protec-
tions but feel that the state's interest in interfering with privacy is
considerably stronger when the person claiming the protection is
disabled. Arguably, however, a showing of disability alone should
not increase the state's interest without a showing that sterilization
is justified in the individual case. 98 The Buck decision, however, al-
lows states to sterilize developmentally disabled individuals on little
more than a showing that they are in fact disabled. 99 In Buck, the
disabling paradigm became a matter of constitutional law, as a pro-
tected element of the states' inherent power to act in the public
interest.1 00
In the post-opinion rush to adopt involuntary sterilization stat-
utes, thirty states passed such laws. 10 1 Although most states have
either altered the tone of sterilization statutes to minimize their eu-
genic origin or have repealed them entirely, the statutes that cur-
rently exist are inconsistent; legislatures follow either the disabling
paradigm, the enabling paradigm, or a combination of the two.102
Legal issues surrounding sterilization of the developmentally
disabled magnify the conflict between disabling and enabling para-
digms of disability. For example, a lawmaker framing the steriliza-
tion decision within the disabling paradigm may authorize
involuntary sterilizations more often and with a minimal degree of
procedural protections on the assumption that a person who is sig-
nificantly mentally disabled is both unlikely to contribute to the
quality of the communal gene pool and unable to cope with the re-
sults of parenthood.10 3 Under this approach, any protected interest
98 See Wald, supra note 42, at 1059 (citation omitted).
99 According to the tenets of eugenic science, a mentally retarded person is auto-
matically "the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise af-
flicted," and is therefore subject to sterilization under the Virginia law upheld in Buck.
274 U.S. at 207.
100 Id ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.") (Holmes, J.).
101 Julie Marcus, Note, In Re Romero: Sterilization and Competency, 68 DENV. U. L.
Rav. 105, 106 (1991).
102 Cf Dunn, supra note 24. In an appendix, the author provides an informative
breakdown of the sterilization statutes on the books as of 1975. Of the 24 statutes ana-
lyzed, only 5 required a court proceeding; 16 gave authority to institute the proceeding
to the superintendant of a care facility; 19 required the subject to be present at the
proceeding; only 16 required the subject to receive notice of the decision and 12 gave
the subject the right to obtain counsel.
103 See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 39, at 168.
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the disabled person may have in her reproductive autonomy would
pale in comparison to the state's interest in preventing the prolifera-
tion of retarded or neglected children.
Conversely, a lawmaker acting within the enabling paradigm
may deny involuntary sterilization absent a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that parenthood would be beyond the capacity
of the disabled person or would seriously harm that person.° 4 Such
a lawmaker will not readily assume that a person who meets a
clinical standard of mental disability is more likely to have afflicted
or neglected offspring, and will therefore believe that maximum def-
erence should be given to her reproductive autonomy.' 05
B. Disabling and Enabling Paradigms in the Sterilization
Context: Legislation
The intervening shift in the medical and legal perceptions of
persons with disabilities, 10 6 coupled with the development of "re-
productive privacy" jurisprudence, 10 7 has led to a radical shift in the
policy justification behind sterilization statutes. 10 Such statutes are
currently justified as guaranteeing an important privacy right for the
developmentally disabled, who would otherwise be unable to
choose sterilization 0 9 because doctors will refuse to perform the
operation absent legal authority."Il 0 This rationale works well only if
104 Cf Brakel, supra note 6, at 218 (condemning eugenic sterilization rationales and
advocating stringent protections on reproductive autonomy).
105 See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981)
(The right to choose among procreation, sterilization and other methods
of contraception is an important privacy right of all individuals. Our
courts must preserve that right. When an incompetent person lacks
mental capacity to make that choice, a court should ensure exercise of
that right on behalf of the incompetent in a manner that reflects his or
her best interests.);
Ross, supra note 3, at 642-43.
106 See supra notes 29-78 and accompanying text; see also Brakel, supra note 6, at 17-
18.
107 See infra notes 131-54 and accompanying text (suggesting that sterilization of the
developmentally disabled may be increasingly used as a tool for "normalization").
108 Cf Burnett, supra note 13, at 923-24.
109 See Scott, supra note 71, at 807:
Sterilization law has undergone a radical transformation in recent years.
Influenced by a distaste for eugenic sterilization and a desire to redress
past injustices, the emerging law seeks to protect the interests of mentally
disabled persons by erecting formidable barriers to sterilization. The
policy goals of this reform movement are commendable. However, in its
singleminded effort to prevent erroneous sterilizations, the law departs
from its underlying objectives: to protect where possible the individual's
right to make her own reproductive decisions and to ensure that any deci-
sion made by others will best protect her interests (citation omitted).
110 See Alan B. Munro, Note, The Sterilization Rights of Mental Retardates, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 207, 212-13 (1982).
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the statute authorizing sterilization maximizes the disabled person's
ability to choose. This, however, is often not the case.
States that confer authority to order sterilizations by statute
vary widely in their protection of the disabled person's reproductive
autonomy. They range from Mississippi, which has essentially the
same statute as that upheld in Buck v. Bell,' 1 ' to Maine, which maxi-
mizes reproductive autonomy through a series of strict procedural
and substantive protections." 2 The difference between the Missis-
sippi and Maine statutes rests not merely upon a different degree of
awareness concerning the need to protect reproductive choice, but
also upon whether the operating assumption of the legislation is dis-
abling or enabling." 3
These considerations are inextricably linked; normalization pol-
iies naturally seek to preserve reproductive autonomy as an impor-
tant facet of the retarded person's general autonomy," 4 whereas
eugenic policies see reproductive autonomy for the retarded as a
threat to the welfare of the state. 1 5 As this Note will show, steriliza-
tion laws failing to reflect an enabling view of the developmentally
111 Compare the following provisions of the Mississippi statutes with those of the
Virginia statute, discussed supra note 80 and accompanying text:
Whenever the director... shall be of the opinion that it is for the best
interests of the patients and of society that any inmate.., should be
sexually sterilized, such director is hereby authorized to perform... the
operation of sterilization on any such patient confined in such institution
afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbe-
cility, feeble-mindedness, or epilepsy...
If the board shall find that the inmate is insane, idiotic, imbecile, feeble-
minded or epileptic, and by the laws of heredity is the probable potential
parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted, that the said in-
mate may be sexually sterilized without detriment to his or her general
health, and that the welfare of the inmate and of society will be promoted
by such sterilization, the said board may order the director to perform...
the operation ....
See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1, 41-45-9 (1972 & Supp. 1992).
112 See The Due Process in Sterilization Act of 1982, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B &
§§ 7001-17 (West 1988). The Act requires a court order in all sterilizations. The Acts
also requires informed consent or statutorily authorized excuse from such consent. See
infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
113 For example, the Mississippi statute exhorts the board ruling on a sterilization
petition to consult the "laws of heredity" to determine if the subject is the "probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring." Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-45-9 (1972).
As stated earlier, such laws are highly questionable and likely serve to mask the un-
founded fears and prejudices of the decision-maker. See supra part II.B.2.a.
In contrast, the Maine statute explicitly states its goal of normalization. See discus-
sion of the Maine statute, infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
114 Cf Wald, supra note 42, at 1035-36. ("With an increasing acceptance of the prin-
ciple of 'normalization,' however, I predict the future course of litigation in this field will
involve more rights to community services ... I believe it will also deal with the legal,
personal, and civil rights of [mentally retarded] people.").
115 See discussion supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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disabled represent substantively poor policy choices as well as possi-
ble violations of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 116
1. The Normalization Argument in the Legislative Context
The normalization argument in favor of maximally protective
sterilization laws seeks to conform sterilization law to other areas of
the law that reflect normalization policies. 117 Since these policies
encourage self-reliance and independence for the retarded, 118 they
are essentially enabling.
Sterilization decisions made within the enabling paradigm look
not to the tenuous ground of hereditary affliction, but rather to the
best interests of the retarded person and her ability to perform com-
petently as a parent." 9 Thus, a legislature acting on the assump-
tions of the enabling paradigm will individualize the sterilization
proceeding, believing that a fair determination must involve an indi-
vidual assessment.' 20 For example, the Maine Due Process in Steril-
ization Act12 1 requires a judicial determination that the disabled
person is "not able to give informed consent" before the guardian's
sterilization petition will be considered.' 22 Even then, the court may
only grant the petition if it finds that sterilization is in that person's
"best interests."'123
Conversely, a legislative body acting within the disabling para-
digm will be frugal with procedural protections, believing that, once
116 U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .. "
117 See generally Scott, supra note 72, at 808.
118 See Roos, supra note 3, at 613-15.
119 Cf Wald supra note 42, at 1059 (quoting John B. Fotheringham The Concept of
Social Competence as applied to Marriage and Child Care in Those Classified as Mentally Retarded,
104 CMAJ. 813 (1971)).
120 For example, Oregon's sterilization statute requires the following findings:
a) the individual is physically capable of procreating;
b) the individual is likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in
the near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy;
c) all less drastic alternative contraceptive measures, including supervi-
sion, education and training, have proved unworkable or inapplicable, or
are medically contra-indicated;
d) the proposed method of sterilization conforms with standard medical
practice, is the least intrusive method available and appropriate, and can
be carried out without reasonable risk to the life and health of the individ-
ual; and
e) the nature and extent of the individual's disability, as determined.by
empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of standardized tests, ren-
ders the individual permanently incapable of caring for and raising a
child, even with reasonable assistance.
OR. REV. STAT. § 436.205 (1992).
121 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7001-17 (West 1988).
122 Id. § 7004.
123 Id. § 7010.
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the crucial element of developmental disability is established, more
process would only inhibit the legislative agenda. 124 For example,
under the Mississippi sterilization statute, the subject of a steriliza-
tion proceeding may obtain judicial review only after the hospital
board of trustees makes an initial determination. 125 Even then, the
court proceeding is limited to a determination of whether the board
has any foundation for its belief that "the inmate is insane, idiotic,
imbecile . . . and by the laws of heredity is the probable potential
parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted."' 126
If one favors the implementation of normalization policies
through law, one will likewise favor the assumptions and results im-
plicit in enabling legislation. This is because legislation that individ-
ualizes the sterilization decision necessarily conforms with policies
that seek to augment the autonomy and self-reliance of disabled
persons.' 27 Similarly, one favoring policies of normalization will
condemn disabling sterilization legislation primarily on three
grounds: 1) it devalues the mentally disabled person by appropriat-
ing an important aspect of her autonomy without a showing that
such appropriation is necessary to further a compelling interest; 128
124 Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927):
The judgment [of the directors] finds that Carrie Buck "is the probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that
she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health
and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her steriliza-
tion" and thereupon makes the order. In view of the general declarations
of the Legislature and the specific findings of the Court, obviously we
cannot say as a matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they
exist they justify the result.
Id. at 207.
Since no evidence was presented concerning Carrie Buck's ability to be a parent,
and there was no suggestion that mental or physical harm would occur as a result of
pregnancy, it is apparent that the sterilization decision was based primarily on Buck's
"feeble-mindedness."
125 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-11 (1972).
126 Cf MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-13 (1972)
(Upon such review, the said chancery court, or judge thereof, may affirm,
revise, or reverse the orders of the board of trustees of mental institu-
tions so reviewed and may enter such order as it deems just and right
Implicitly, the court will review the Board's decision under the controlling language of
the Mississippi statute. This limiting language is quoted in the text supra.
127 But see Burnett, supra note 13, at 923 ("Sterilization of the retarded may increase
with the growing acceptance of the concept of 'normalization' as a primary goal in the
treatment of the disabled.... Some parents, legislators, and judges may regard sterili-
zation as a prerequisite to community living.").
This conclusion seems counter-intuitive, however, when one considers the adverse
psychological impact of sterilization on the retarded individual, a consequence with dev-
astating implications for any course of treatment emphasizing normalization. See Philip
Roos, Psychological Impact of Sterilization on the Individual, 1 LAw & PsYcHiATRY REv. 47
(1975).
128 See Ross, supra note 3, at 611.
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2) it frustrates normalization policies by discouraging, rather than
encouraging, autonomy and self-reliance on the part of the dis-
abled;129 and 3) it places the disabled in an equivocal position
before the law by subjecting their reproductive freedoms to a large
degree of uncertainty. 130 This last point foreshadows the second
substantive basis upon which one may attack disabling presump-
tions in legislation.
2. The Constitutional Argument in the Legislative Context
Although the Supreme Court has not considered due process
and equal protection arguments against involuntary sterilization
statutes since Buck v. Bell,13 1 commentators have suggested that the
intervening years and the rise of reproductive privacy rights would
mandate a different result were the case adjudicated today. 132 At the
very least, these developments mandate a reassessment of Justice
Holmes' analysis in Buck.
The strongest argument against the constitutional validity of
minimally protective statutes, such as Mississippi's, rests upon sub-
stantive due process protections against laws that infringe upon re-
productive autonomy and family privacy. 133 Indeed, -one of the
foundational cases establishing present privacy protections, Skinner
v. Oklahoma,13 4 involved a sterilization statute that was struck down
as unconstititional.13 5 In Skinner, the petitioner, a recidivist felon
who had tWice been convicted of robbery, was sentenced to steriliza-
tion under a statute that authorized the sterilization of persons pre-
viously convicted two or more times of crimes " 'amounting to
felonies involving moral turpitude.' "136
129 See Id. at 621; Dunn, supra note 24, at 293-94.
130 See Burnett, supra note 13, at 924.
131 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
132 See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 472 (N.J. 1981); Burnett, supra note 13, at
919; Dunn, supra note 24, at 297.
133 See LAUREbiCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1339-40 (2d ed. 1988):
Although the Court had earlier upheld the state's power to sterilize an
individual against her objection in order to prevent the birth of whatJus-
tice Holmes callously characterized as "imbeciles," and although that ear-
lier holding continues to be cited without obvious disapproval from time
to time, it is hard to square the basic philosophy of Skinner v. Oklahoma
with the proposition that the state may usurp the individual's procreative
choices in an irreversible way-whether by sterilization or compulsory
breeding... [t]he meaning of Skinner is that whether one person's body shall be
the source of another life must be left to that person and that person alone to decide.
(citations omitted).
Id.
134 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
135 OILA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171-82 (West 1935) (declared unconstitutional in
1942).
136 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
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The Supreme Court ruled that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause13 7 because it exempted from the sterilization pen-
alty those guilty of "embezzlement, political offenses and revenue
act violations," crimes that were "intrinsically the same" as rob-
bery.13 8 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the ba-
sic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race .... [In] evil or
reckless hands [the power to sterilize] can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.
There is no redemption for the individual whom the law
touches.... [He] is forever deprived of a basic liberty.13 9
Although the decision did not explicitly overrule Buck v. Bell, its
rationale severely limited Justice Holmes' conclusion that the statute
at issue in Buck did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.' 40 Jus-
tice Douglas's opinion in Skinner indicates that a more rigorous scru-
tiny is applicable to sterilization statutes than the "rational basis"
test implicitly used in Buck.' 4' As a result, a state cannot mandate
sterilization merely by indicating a policy and drawing a convenient
line, 42 but, rather, should indicate an interest sufficiently compel-
ling to overcome the "basic civil right" at stake.1 43 Presumably, a
vague and unsubstantiated fear of being "swamped with incompe-
tence"' 44 would not suffice as a compelling interest.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, such as Griswold v. Con-
necticut,' 45 Eisenstadt v. Baird,146 and Carey v. Population Services Interna-
137 U.S. CONST., amend XIV (nor shall any State... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
138 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
139 Id.
140 See TRIBE, supra note 133; Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1011.
141 See Burgdorf& Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1009
(One of the most basic problems with the Buck v. Bell decision is its super-
ficial constitutional analysis .... [Tihe rational basis [test used in Buck]
has ceased to be the only test for equal protection arguments. Today,
strict scrutiny and even a balancing approach may be used.).
142 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 ("Strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes
in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations
are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guar-
anty ofjust and equal laws.").
143 See Burnett, supra note 13 at 919; Ross, supra note 3 at 611; Estacio, supra note 25,
at 92-93; see also North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. State, 420 F. Supp. 451
(M.D.N.C. 1976) (applying strict scrutiny review to sterilization claim).
144 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
145 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a statute outlawing the use of contraceptives is
unconstitutionally restrictive of married couple's right of privacy).
146 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending fundamental right of privacy over contraceptive
decisions to single persons).
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tiona1147 have both reaffirmed the notion that reproductive
autonomy is an important civil right and broadened the significance
of that right to strike down statutes on both due process and equal
protection grounds.' 48
The most recent of these cases is Carey v. Population Services.' 49
In Carey, the Court invalidated a New York law' 50 that allowed only
pharmacists to sell nonmedical contraceptive devices to persons
over sixteen.' 5 ' Speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice Bren-
nan found that the decision to use contraceptives fell squarely
within the zone of protected privacy interests delineated in Gris-
wold.' 52 The Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to the statute's
prohibition on the sale of contraceptives, stating that, "where a de-
cision as fundamental as that of whether to bear or beget a child is
involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only
by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only those interests."' 53 The Court found none of the inter-
ests advanced to be sufficiently compelling. 154
Involuntary sterilization is a form of nonconsensual contracep-
tion.1 55 Sterilization statutes should therefore be subject to strict
scrutiny analysis under the Carey standard. 156 As this Note will
147 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (ruling that legislation impacting decision to "bear and be-
get a child" is subject to strict scrutiny review).
148 WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUES-
TIONS 455 (6th ed. 1986).
149 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
150 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972).
151 The statute at issue made it a misdemeanor for any person to sell or distribute
contraceptives to a minor under sixteen years old. The statute also restricted the distri-
bution of contraceptives to licensed pharmacists for persons of any age. Carey, 431 U.S.
at 681 n.1.
152 Carey, 431 U.S. at 685
(The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart
of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a
particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy, a right
first explicitly recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Conneticut ... [I]n a
field that by definition concerns the most intimate of human activities and
relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception
are among the most private and sensitive (citations omitted)).
153 Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
154 While noting that state interests such as "maintaining medical standards," "pro-
tecting health," and "protecting potential life" would qualify as "compelling," 431 U.S.
at 689-90, the Court felt that none of these interests were furthered by the New- York
statute.
155 See Bernard M. Dickens, Retardation and Sterilization, 5 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
295, 297 (1982).
156 The test used in Carey was originally announced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155-56 (1973) ("[W]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held
that regulation limiting these rights may bejustified only by a 'compelling state interest,'
and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." (citations omitted)).
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show, an application of the Carey test to both the Maine Due Process
in Sterilization Act and the Mississippi Sexual Sterilization Act indi-
cates that enabling and disabling presumptions in law affect the con-
stitutional validity of legislation that touches the reproductive
privacy rights of the developmentally disabled.
a. Constitutional Case Study: The Mississippi Statute
The primary interest underlying Mississippi's sterilization stat-
ute is the prevention of hereditary disability among the state's citi-
zens.' 57 This interest is linked to the presumptory conclusion that
mental disability obeys some vaguely defined "law of heredity," and
implies that the state may sterilize those whose genetic contribu-
tions to the public weal are likely to be deficient. The rationale for
this statute is thus explicitly eugenic, and its operative paradigm is
disabling.158 Moreover, an application of the Carey test to the Mis-
sissippi law indicates that it infringes upon the liberty interests of
developmentally disabled persons in violation of the Due Process
Clause.
This infringement occurs because the state's interest fails to be
compelling and the means used to fulfill that interest fail to be nar-
rowly tailored. In comparison to interests deemed compelling, such
as maintaining medical standards or protecting potential life,' 59 a
state's interest in the genetic quality of its citizens seems deficient.
Moreover, there is a lack of hard evidence suggesting that mentally
disabled parents are significantly more likely to produce mentally
disabled offspring than are normal parents.' 60 In fact, studies indi-
cate that it is more likely that a normal parent will produce disabled
offspring than a developmentally disabled parent per se.' 6'
In addition, if the Mississippi statute implicitly supports the in-
terest of the state in insuring the genetic quality of its citizens, it is
difficult to characterize the statute as a "narrowly tailored" means to
achieve that end. As written, the Mississippi statute is both underin-
157 The purpose of the statute is to allow the involuntary sterilization of persons
"afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, or fee-
ble-mindedness." Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (1972).
158 For the connection between disabling presumptions and eugenic sterilization
statutes, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
159 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690 (1977).
160 See Dunn, supra note 24, at 286-87.
161 See Eugenic Sterilization, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 212 (Samuel J.
Brakel et al. eds., rev. ed. 1971).
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clusive t62 and overinclusive. 163 It is underinclusive, because if the
state wishes to curtail hereditary afflictions,' 64 it should sterilize all
persons having identifiable hereditary afflictions, including alcohol-
ism and myopia. It is overinclusive because the broad rubric of de-
velopmental disabilities, many of them environmental in origin, 165
forces the state either to determine whether the particular form of
retardation at issue is genetically transmissible or to risk sterilizing a
mentally disabled person whose affliction is non-hereditary.
b. Constitutional Counterpoint: The Maine Statute
The primary purpose underlying Maine's sterilization act is to
ensure the well-being of its mentally disabled citizens through equal
access to "desired medical procedures."'166 Statutes premised upon
the "best interests" of the retarded person, while capable of abuse,
are more likely to support enabling assumptions about the repro-
ductive privacy rights of the developmentally disabled. 167 Further-
more, such statutes are more likely to withstand the constitutional
analysis outlined in Carey. Whereas eugenic statutes place greater
value on a disability-free society than on a mentally disabled per-
son's right to "bear and beget" a child, "best interests" statutes
generally stress reproductive choice. 168 Thus, Maine's Due Process
in Sterilization Act of 1982169 states in its preamble:
[S]terilization procedures are generally irreversible and represent
potentially permanent and highly significant consequences for the
patient involved. The Legislature recognizes that certain legal
safeguards are necessary to prevent indiscriminate and unneces-
sary sterilization and to assure equal access to desired medical
procedures for all Maine citizens.1 70
162 A statute is underinclusive when a classification drawn by the statute fails to in-
clude within its boundries all persons who may cause the harm that the statute seeks to
address. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
163 A statute is overinclusive if it draws a classification that contains persons who are
not causing the harm it seeks to avoid. Id.
164 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
165 See Ross, supra note 3, at 613.
166 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7002 (West 1988).
167 In fact, best interests standards for authorizing involuntary sterilization are com-
monly justified as the state's constructive use of the retarded person's ability to consent,
which they cannot exercize due to their disability. It has been argued that such statutes
are necessary in order to guaranty the retarded person's ability to choose sterilization.
Carla I. Struble, Note, Protection of the Mentally Retarded Individual's Right to Choose Steriliza-
tion: the Effect of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 12 CAP. U. L. REv. 413, 418
(1983).
168 See Denise Lachance, In re Grady: The Mentally Retarded Individual's Right to Choose
Sterilization, 6 AM. J. L. & MED. 559, 572 (1981).
169 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7001-17 (West 1988).
170 Id. § 7002.
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The Maine statute is conceived, not as a way to protect society's
interest in genetic purity, but as an opportunity to impose important
safeguards on a dangerous medical procedure.' 7' The orientation
of Maine's statute significantly differs from that of the Mississippi
Sexual Sterilization Act. Maine's statute provides "equal access to
medical procedures" for the mentally disabled by enabling others to
make the sterilization decision on their behalf in certain specified
instances.' 72 In short, the Maine statute is a clear reflection of the
policies of normalization and is cast squarely within the enabling
paradigm. 73
Significantly, the very qualities that characterize the Due Pro-
cess in Sterilization Act as an "enabling" statute also cause it to be
amenable to a constitutional analysis under the Carey test. The
"compelling state interest" standard is arguably met by the need for
legislatures to provide guidance in the administration of a politically
sensitive medical procedure that would otherwise be left to the dis-
cretion of state courts. 174 Doctors, fearful of potential tort liability,
generally refuse to sterilize mentally disabled patients without the
approval of a legal authority. 175 In the absence of legislation, courts
generally refuse jurisdiction 76 or hear the case and apply their own
version of a best interests test.177 These common law tests often
provide negligible protection for the disabled person's privacy, and
may ignore the potential health risks of the operation altogether. 78
171 Sheila M. Donahue, Note, In re Debra B.: The Best Interest Standard in Court-Author-
ized Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 39 ME. L. REv. 209, 210-11 (1987).
172 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7010-7013 (West 1988).
173 Recall that the normalization principle urges that retarded people be treated as
much as possible like other people. Roos, supra note 3, at 614. The Maine statute fur-
thers this goal by attempting to extend equal access to medical procedures to retarded
persons.
174 See Burnett, supra note 13, at 928.
175 See Munro, supra note 110, at 211.
176 See, e.g., Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. 1969) (sterilization decision does
not fall within generaljurisdiction of the court); In re D.D., 394 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1977)
(noting that restrictions on right to bear children must meet "compelling state interest"
test and stating: "[t]he sounder view ...is that in the absence of specific statutory
authority, the courts lack jurisdiction to make this fundamental and irreversible
decision").
177 See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981) (noting the potential for
abuse but stating that "[s]ince the sterilization decision involves a variety of factors well
suited to rational development in judicial proceedings, a court can take cognizance of
these factors and reach a fair decision of what is the incompetent's best interest."); In re
Sallmaier, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (1976) (findingjurisdiction over the sterilization deci-
sion arising from "the common-law jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to act as parens
patriae with respect to incompetents").
178 See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding state judge immune
from § 1983 suit brought by woman he had ordered sterilized; the judge had ordered
the sterilization at the request of the woman's mother without a hearing, notice to the
woman, or appointment of a guardian ad litem).
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Given these undesirable results, the state could certainly claim a
compelling interest in safeguarding the lives and well-being of men-
tally disabled persons by imposing uniformly rigorous standards for
sterilization.
Similarly, the Maine statute is narrowly tailored to enable the
developmentally disabled to be sterilized without their consent only
when health reasons necessitate such an operation. Procedural pro-
tections built into the statute make informed consent a prerequisite
to any sterilization; 179 in its absence, two hearings are required.
The first hearing determines whether the subject is capable of in-
formed consent; if so, the operation will be authorized if consent is
given.' 80 If the subject is found incapable of informed consent, a
second hearing is held to determine whether sterilization is in her
best interests.' 8 ' For sterilization to be authorized, it must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) less drastic meth-
ods of contraception have proven to be unworkable, 8 2 and 2) steril-
ization is necessary to preserve the physical and mental health of the
person.'83 The relationship between the means and ends of the
statute is tight, as only those who need the sterilization procedure
for health reasons are subject to the statute.
C. The Persistence of the Disabling Paradigm and the Failure
of Fundamental Rights
Although legislative activity has increased the visibility of the
enabling paradigm, it is doubtful that the now largely conservative
Supreme Court 8 4 will overrule Buck v. Bell. 185 In fact, a string of
cases since Carey, which deal with the rights of developmentally dis-
abled persons, have indicated that the Court's primary policy in this
area is one of non-intervention.' 8 6
In Youngberg v. Romeo,' 8 7 the Court considered the constitu-
tional due process rights of involuntarily committed mentally dis-
abled persons for the first time.' 8  The respondent was a
179 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7004.(1) (West 1988).
180 Id. § 7008.
181 Id. § 7013.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Linda Greenhouse, Court Serves Notice of Its Transformation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1992 at E3.
185 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For discussion, see supra notes 87-105 and accompanying
text.
186 See discussion infra notes 187-226 and accompanying text.
187 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
188 Id. at 314.
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profoundly retarded man 189 who suffered injuries as a result of poor
safety conditions at a state institution.19 0 The respondent claimed
constitutional rights to 1) safe conditions of confinement, 2) free-
dom from bodily restraint, and 3) minimally adequate
habilitation.19 1
In reasoning that an involuntarily committed person's liberty
interests "require the State to provide minimally adequate or rea-
sonable training to ensure safety,"' 9 2 the Court indicated in dicta
that a considerably less protective due process test may apply to
mentally disabled persons confined to state institutions:
In determining whether a substantive right protected by the Due
Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance "the
liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an organized soci-
ety". . . the Constitution only requires that the courts make cer-
tain that professional judgment was in fact exercized.' 9 3
Thus, Youngberg develeps a balancing test for the protection of
due process rights of the developmentally disabled in state institu-
tions that bears an uncomfortable resemblance to Mississippi's ex-
hortation that sterilizations be performed when in the "best
interests of society."' 94 Under Youngberg, it could very well be that
the "demands of organized society," if pressing enough to justify
the neglectful treatment of disabled persons in state institutions,
would justify "therapeutic" involuntary sterilization.' 9 5 Ironically, if
interpreted in this way, Youngberg curtails the due process protec-
tions available to those that need them most: institutionalized per-
189 Id. at 309 ("Respondent ... has the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child,
with an I.Q. between 8 and 10.").
190 Id. at 3 10 ("The complaint alleged that 'during the periodJuly, 1974 to the pres-
ent, plaintiff has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions.' ").
191 Id. at 315 ("[respondent] argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training within the institution.").
192 Id. at 319.
193 Id. at 320-21.
194 See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
195 Admittedly, Youngberg concerned the institutionalized person's right to treat-
ment, which is derived from due process protections of the "liberty" of the individual.
457 U.S. at 316; see also Linda V. Gallo, Note, Youngberg v. Romeo: The Right to Treat-
ment Dilemma and the Mentally Retarded, 47 ALB. L. Rzv. 179, 187 (1982). Sterilization,
although it certainly touches upon one's "right to be free from physical restraint," is
generally thought to infringe upon the "penumbral" privacy rights of the individual,
which have typically been afforded a higher level of protection. Arguably, however, a
very close analogy exists between state interests implicated in Youngberg (fiscal and ad-
ministrative necessity) and those at issue in sterilization cases. Moreover, the steriliza-
tion of an institutionalized person may be characterized as within the zone of deference
to the decisions of health care professionals calculated in Romeo. Cf. Phyllis P. Dietz,
Note, The Constitutional Right to Treatment in Light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 72 GEO. L.J.
1785, 1796 (1984).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sons who, under the complete supervision of the state, are most
likely to suffer abuse at the state's hands. 196
The Court's abridgement of the rights of the institutionalized
disabled in Youngberg was continued in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 197 where the Court dispensed with the possibility that
the mentally disabled could qualify as a suspect or even "quasi-sus-
pect" class. 198 In Cleburne, a Texas City Council denied a permit for
the operation of a group home for the developmentally disabled.' 99
The home was expected to house thirteen mentally disabled men
and women who would be under the constant supervision of staff
members. 200 The City Council denied the permit for the following
reasons: (1) the negative attitude of adjacent property owners;20 '
(2) concerns that residents would be subject to abuse from local
high school students; 20 2 (3) the location of the living center on a
"500 year flood plain"; 20 3 and (4) the size of the home and number
of prospective residents.20 4
The Court found that the city's refusal to grant a permit vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause because "the record [did] not re-
veal any rational basis for believing that the... home would pose
any special threat to the city's legitimate interests." 20 5 The real sig-
nificance of Cleburne, however, was revealed in dicta, where Justice
White stated:
[W]e conclude ... that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification .... First, ...
those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope
with and function in the everyday world.... They are thus differ-
ent, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the States' interest in
dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one....
Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments
about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the predicate for
such judicial oversight is present where the classification deals
with mental retardation. 20 6
196 See Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 6 at 251.
197 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
198 See Mark V. Wunder, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A Denial
of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IowA L. REv.
241-42 (1986).
199 473 U.S. at 437.
200 Id. at 435.
201 Id. at 448.
202 Id. at 449.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 448.
206 Id. at 442-43.
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The Court went on to distinguish the mentally disabled from other
"discrete and insular" minorities, whose isolation from majoritarian
legislatures has traditionally provided the justification for an in-
terventionist response by the Court:20 7
the distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the
plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only
that they have unique problems, but also that the lawmakers have
been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a contin-
uing antipathy... and a corresponding need for more intrusive
oversight by the judiciary.208
Thus the Court openly declared itself to be relatively hostile to
an expansionist reading of fundamental rights for the developmen-
tally disabled 209 and emphasized the disabled's "reduced ability to
cope with the everyday world." This formed the basis for its finding
that individuals with disabilities were "immutably different" and
thus subject to being singled out by legislatures without heightened
scrutiny.2 10 In doing so, the Court closed its eyes to the history of
alienation and abuse that defines much of the mentally disabled's
experience. 211
The majority's dismissive dicta has chilled the possibility of
greater constitutional protections for the developmentally dis-
abled. 212 Cleburne suggests that the Court will apply a "rational ba-
sis" test213 to legislation that singles out the disabled for special
treatment; Youngberg suggests that the rights of institutionalized
mentally disabled persons will be subject to a substantive due pro-
cess "balancing" test. Read together, the tests limit the circum-
stances under which a Carey strict scrutiny test will be applied to
alleged violations of the disabled's privacy rights.
207 "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
ingjudicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
208 473 U.S. at 443.
209 See 473 U.S. at 446 ("[W]e will not presume that any given legislative action,
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the
Constitution will not tolerate.").
210 I& at 444.
211 See Brakel, supra note 6.
212 See 473 U.S. at 474 ("[Tfhe Court's as-applied remedy relegates future retarded
applicants to the standardless discretion of low-level officials who have already shown an
all too willing readiness to be captured by.. . 'vague, undifferentiated fears ... .
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
213 But see TRIBE, supra note 133, at 1444 (suggesting that the Court in Cleburne ap-
plied a hybrid scrutiny test somewhat more protective than the traditional rational basis
test).
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In addition, the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 14 which
held that private consensual homosexual sodomy is unprotected
under the Skinner-Griswold-Eisenstadt-Carey line of cases, 21 5 presents
yet another limitation on reproductive privacy rights for the dis-
abled. In Bowers, the Court narrowed its reading of fundamental
rights either to those that "are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' " such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they]
were sacrificed," 21 6 or to those that are " 'deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition.' "217
The history of involuntary sterilization 218 indicates that the no-
tion of reproductive freedom for the developmentally disabled is
anything but "deeply rooted" in the nation's history. As Justice
Holmes' opinion in Buck 219 indicates, many have felt that justice de-
mands the sterilization of the disabled so that the state may be
stronger, just as the state may demand the sacrifice of its "best citi-
zens" in times of war.220 The increasingly conservative Court is re-
luctant to expand its former role as protector of the
disenfranchised. 221 Consequently, the Court has implicitly denied
the mentally disabled rigorous constitutional protections on the
state's power to regulate their reproductive capabilities.
The implications of this development for a widespread adop-
tion of the enabling paradigm in sterilization laws are disheartening.
The Court's retrenchment has ensured the continuing viability of
the disabling paradigm as the normative measure for laws affecting
the mentally disabled's reproductive privacy. According to Cleburne,
the disabled are "immutably different," and legislation singling
them out is thus afforded a presumption of validity. 222 In Youngberg,
the state's interest in administrative convenience outweighs the dis-
abled's right to be free from unnecessary restraints. 223 Neither deci-
sion addresses the situation in which the state singles out
developmentally disabled persons for sterilization.
214 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
215 Id. at 190-91.
216 Id. at 191-92.
217 Id.
218 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
219 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
220 Id. at 207.
221 In fact, the Court currently exhibits an active desire to shrink this role. See
Greenhouse, supra note 184, at E3 (discussing Presley v. Etowah County, 112 S. Ct. 820
(1992)).
222 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
223 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) ("By... limiting judicial review
of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized.").
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Sterilization statutes should pass the Carey test because they are
state actions affecting the decision to reproduce. Equally clear,
however, is the Court's consensus that special laws addressed to the
disabled are acceptable. 224 The implication is that a strict scrutiny
test may not be applicable to sterilization statutes addressed solely
to the disabled.
In previous sections of this Note, the advantage of enabling as-
sumptions has been discussed.225 The problem is that the notion of
a constitutionally protected right of reproductive privacy for the de-
velopmentally disabled lacks solid grounding. The right of repro-
ductive privacy is crucial to the widespread implementation of
enabling assumptions in sterilization laws. The limitations of the
Supreme Court decisions discussed above provide a shaky founda-
tion for fostering reproductive privacy rights, especially for a group
that historically has had none. However, Justice White was quite
correct in Cleburne when he emphasized the growing role that reme-
dial legislation has played in shaping the rights of the mentally dis-
abled.226 The remainder of this Note focuses on Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and its impact upon state-
sanctioned sterilizations of the disabled.
III
THE AMERICANS wrrI DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: A
FEDERAL MANDATE FOR THE ENABLING
PARADIGM?
Although our dignity and confidence make us strive to be in-
dependent and invulnerable, compassion and reality require us to
recognize the vulnerability that social structures often exacerbate.
The task is thus truly a Herculean one. While it may be too much
to ask of any law, the ADA by its ambition, invites the question:
does it meet the challenge?227
The newly enacted Americans with Disabilities Act 228 (ADA) ar-
guably addresses the decision to sterilize involuntarily a develop-
mentally disabled person.
Policies of normalization, which seek to alleviate the impact of
disabilities by bringing disabled persons into the social mainstream,
provide the basis for enabling legislation. Statutes based upon en-
abling assumptions will seek to maximize autonomy in order to en-
224 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 444.
225 See supra notes 184-223 and accompanying text.
226 473 U.S. at 443.
227 Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 334 (1990).
228 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
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courage integration. These goals are at the core of the ADA, a
statute primarily intended to foster independence by eradicating
disabling stereotypes.229
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment,230 public
services, 231 and public accommodations. 232 When sterilization pro-
ceedings originate with the state, they may be characterized as
"public services," and thus may come within the purview of the
statute.
A. The ADA as a Guide to Policy Implementation
The ADA is an equal opportunity statute; one of its goals is to
set the disabled on equal footing in the eyes of the administrative
state.233 Thus all programs, activities, and services "provided or
made available by State and local governments" may not discrimi-
nate on the basis of disability.23 4 At least one commentator on the
ADA has suggested that its anti-discrimination provisions will be
given a narrow reading by the courts. 23 5 Evidence, however, sug-
gests that key anti-discrimination provisions should be interpreted
as they were written: broadly. One need only examine the Findings
and Purposes section of the Act 236 and the relevant legislative his-
tory,23 7 as well as the recently promulgated Department of Justice
regulations, 238 support such a conclusion. For example, the Con-
gressional Findings and Purposes indicate that:
229 Parmet, supra note 227, at 340.
230 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (West Supp. 1992).
231 Id. § 12132.
232 Id. § 12181.
233 The Congressional Findings and Purposes section of the ADA states:
Individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of dis-
crimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory
effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to ex-
isting facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and cri-
teria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities,
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1992).
234 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1991).
235 See Parmet, supra note 227, at 338.
236 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1992).
237 Concluding its report on the need for comprehensive legislation protecting the
rights of the disabled, the House Committee on Education and Labor states:
there is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and for the integration of persons with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of Americian life... there is a need to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination ....
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50 (1989).
238 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1992) (implementing Title II of the Act).
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the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, in-
dependant living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals ..... 239
Thus the opening provisions of the ADA adopt the enabling
paradigm. The Findings echo the principles of normalization and
integration upon which the Act is premised. Although they do not
have the force of law, congressional findings nevertheless have the
potential to direct policy in the courts.240 These findings enable
courts to make principled enabling decisions in sterilization cases.
B. Sterilization as Discrimination under Title II of the ADA
One of the most potentially far reaching provisions of the ADA
is Title II, which prohibits discrimination in the administration of
public services by state and local governments. 24' The Title II pro-
hibition states that:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individ-
ual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to dis-
crimination by any such entity. 242
This section covers "public entities"-defined as any state or local
government or instrumentality thereof.243 This section also pro-
tects "qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies]," 244 who are defined
as "individual[s] ... with disabilit[ies] who, with or without reason-
able modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meet[] the es-
sential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services . . .
provided by a public entity." 245
239 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1992).
240 See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implica-
tions of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 436-37
(1991).
241 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1992). For an overview of this provision, see
Burgdorf, supra note 241, at 464-70.
242 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1992).
243 The relevant portion of the Act reads:
DEFINITION
as used in this subchapter:
(1) PUBLIC ENTlTY.-The term "public entity" means-
(A) any State or local government;
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumen-
tality of a State or States or local government.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (West Supp. 1992).
244 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1992).
245 The relevant portion of the Act reads:
(2) QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILrrY.-The term
"qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a dis-
abilty who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
537
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
An examination of the Act raises the question of whether state-
mandated involuntary sterilization could qualify as an act of discrim-
ination under Title II. The legislative history of the Act and its im-
plementing regulations suggest that it does. The House Committee
on Education and Labor's report on the ADA explicitly mentions
involuntary sterilization as an area of continuing discrimination:
"[discrimination] persists in such critical areas as education, em-
ployment, institutionalization, medical treatment, involuntary steril-
ization, architectural barriers and transportation." 246
In addition, the House Committee's report sets forth a few clear
examples of discrimination, which include the refusal of a New
Jersey zoo keeper to admit children with Down's Syndrome because
he "feared they would upset the chimpanzees," 247 and the exclusion
of an academically competitive cerebral palsied child from public
school because "his teacher claimed his physical appearance 'pro-
duced a nauseating effect' on his classmates. ' 248 The crucial ele-
ments of discrimination in these examples involve differentiation
made solely on the basis of disability without adequate justification.
The disabled are thereby dehumanized, as their desires and needs
are sacrificed either to satisfy society's intangible aesthetic needs or
to placate its irrational fears.
Any action by a public entity that creates an unnecessary or un-
justified distinction between disabled persons and others on the ba-
sis of disability which thereby denies the disabled the opportunity to
receive equal treatment in the provision of services should' consti-
tute discrimination under Title 11.249 The inquiry should address
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essen-
tial eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation
in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
Id. § 12131.
246 H.R. REP. No. 487, supra note 237, at 31 (quoting U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Accomodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities).
247 Id. at 30.
248 Id.
249 See H.R. REP. No. 487, supra note 237, at 29-30
(Discrimination against people with disabilities includes segregation,
exclusion, or other denial of benefits, services or opportunities to people
with disabilities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to
others... [it] also includes adverse actions taken against those regarded
by others as having a disability . . . [s]uch discrimination often results
from false presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing at-
titudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies.);
see also Martha T. McCluskey, Note, Rethinking Equality and Diference: Disability Discrimina-
tion in Public Transportation, 97 YALE LJ. 863, 878-79 (1988)
(Disability discrimination doctrine should confront the prejudice that
makes the "differences" related to disability seem like abnormal, separate
problems that are necessarily disadvantageous. Instead of approving spe-
cial, segregated services, courts and policymakers should follow the dis-
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the relation between the decision to differentiate and the actual ca-
pabilities of the disabled person.250
Under the above analysis, involuntary eugenic sterilization stat-
utes, such as Mississippi's, 251 fall within this proposed statutory defi-
nition of discrimination. By allowing the decisionmaker to single
out the mentally disabled on the premise that they are "by the laws
of heredity.., the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring," 252 the Mississippi statute allows invidious stereotypes
and overbroad generalizations to enter into the sterilization deci-
sion. When a legislature authorizes sterilization because it is in soci-
ety's best interests to minimize the possibility of "socially
inadequate" citizens, the situation is fundamentally the same as a
school board's decision to deny a cerebral palsied child an educa-
tion because it is in the "best interests" of the student body not to
be distracted by the "nauseating" disabilities of others. In both
cases, the decision to differentiate is made solely on the basis of so-
ciety's reaction to the disability, without regard to the capabilities of
the persons being differentiated. 253
The Department of Justice regulations that implement the Act
suggest that involuntary sterilization is within the regulatory ambit
of Title II. The regulations provide:
A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not
directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements,
on the basis of disability ... [p]rovide different or seperate aids,
benefits, or services to individuals with disabilities or to any class
of individuals with disabilities than is provided to others unless
such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with disa-
bilities with ... services that are as effective as those provided to
others.254
State-mandated sterilization of the disabled is discriminatory to the
extent that it represents a "different or seperate service" from that
available to persons who are not disabled, unless it is needed to pro-
vide the disabled with a service that is as effective as that provided
others. Eugenic sterilization statutes, which are explicitly aimed at
eradicating genetically transmissible mental disabilities, always pro-
parate impact model, which generally requires that unjustified policies
with harmful effects be changed as a whole, rather than remedied
through separate policies targeted at the adversely affected groups.).
250 See 28 G.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, Preamble to Regulation on the Basis of Disability in
State and Local Government Service, 440 (1992) ("The starting point is to question
whether the seperate program is in fact necessary or appropriate for the individual.").
251 Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1-41, 45-19, discussed supra notes 157-65 and ac-
companying text.
252 Id. § 41-45-9.
253 See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 237, at 30.
254 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (1992).
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vide a "different" service without regard to the effectiveness of
state-sponsored sterilizations provided to others. In this manner,
eugenic sterilization statutes are always discriminatory under these
regulations. The only limiting factor on this provision operates
when sterilization is part of a state-run or state-funded program
available to all citizens.
For example, if Maine sponsored a planned parenthood pro-
gram enabling eligible participants to obtain state-funded steriliza-
tions at a public hospital, the standards by which the sterilizations
were administered would have to comply with the above provision.
Under the Maine sterilization act, all citizens must first give in-
formed consent before being sterilized.255 Persons whose ability to
consent is questionable, which in most cases will be persons who fall
under the ADA's definition of mentally disabled, are required to un-
dergo a special hearing to determine their ability to consent;25 6 they
are thereby provided with a "different service" under the above reg-
ulations. This service, however, is permissible because it is intended
to identify those mentally disabled persons who are capable of in-
formed consent so that they may obtain a sterilization if they so de-
sire. Those mentally disabled persons capable of informed consent
are "qualified" persons whose ability to consent enables them to
benefit from sterilization procedures on equal footing with the gen-
eral population.
The Preamble to the Department of Justice Regulations offers
further insight into the scope of those duties imposed on public en-
tities by the above provision:
[T]hese provisions are intended to prohibit exclusion and segre-
gation of individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal op-
portunities enjoyed by others .... [P]ublic entities are required to
ensure that their actions are based on facts applicable to individu-
als and not on presumptions as to what a class of individuals with
disabilities can or cannot do. 25 7
The Preamble goes on to indicate what kind of "facts applicable to
individuals" are relevant. They specify:
The determination [to deny equal participation] . . . must be
based on an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judg-
ment that relies on current medical evidence or on the best avail-
able objective evidence, to determine: the nature, duration, and
severity of the [health or safety] risk [of allowing equal participa-
255 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7004. For discussion, see supra notes 166-83 and
accompanying text.
256 Id.
257 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, Preamble to Regulation on the Basis of Disability in
State and Local Government Service, 439 (1992).
540 [Vol. 78:507
1993] NOTE-DISABLING AND ENABLING PARADIGMS 541
tion]; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur;
and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or
procedures will mitigate the risk.258
These regulations, transposed into the context of state-mandated
involuntary sterilizations, suggest that such procedures may be ac-
ceptable if guided by an "individualized assessment, based on rea-
sonable judgment that relies on the best available evidence" that the
failure to sterilize would pose a health risk on a person otherwise
incapable of giving consent. This standard is reminiscent of that
underlying the Maine Due Process in Sterilization Act,259 which re-
quires a judicial proceeding to determine by clear and convincing
evidence that sterilization is "necessary to preserve the physical and
mental health" of the non-consenting disabled person.260
The determinations required under both statutes are similar
because their underlying assumptions are those of the enabling par-
adigm. They both seek to maximize the autonomy and self-reliance
of disabled persons by shifting the balance between their "right to
be free from interference" and society's interest in limiting the im-
pact of their disabilities. By adopting principles of normalization,
these statutes alter the legal conception of disability in order to re-
move its social stigma. One hopes that, if the social experiment en-
visioned by such legislation succeeds, the co-existence of disabling
and enabling paradigms will be a mere resting place in the evolution
of a more holistic legal approach to disability.
CONCLUSION
Conflicting paradigms of what it means to be disabled-and the
proper measures that society should take concerning those with dis-
abilities-have created conflicting legal conceptions of disability. In
many cases, the law assumes that the mentally disabled are incapa-
ble of self-direction, and in these circumstances the law enables
others to act in their behalf. This side of the law is evident in stat-
utes authorizing the non-consensual sterilization of mentally dis-
abled persons. Alternatively, the law seeks to create a sense of
independence and a certain amount of self-sufficiency on the part of
the disabled through statutes that create rights-in the hope that, by
increasing the legal strength of the disabled, such statutes will ulti-
mately alter social expectations and alleviate the impact of disability
on one's potential for a normal life.
Sterilization represents an area of the law that fluctuates be-
tween competing interests. Because the decision to sterilize is im-
258 Id. at 436.
259 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7001-7017.
260 Id. § 7013.
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portant, not only in the personal life of the disabled person but also
as a symbol of the law's fundamental stance towards disability, it
well serves to underscore a basic point: the legal paradigm of disa-
bility is changing. Whether this change will have its desired effect of
increasing independence and self-sufficiency among the disabled re-
mains to be seen.
James C. Dugant
t The author would like to thank Kelly Tullier and Jon Grant for their helpful and
constructive comments. Any errors, mistakes, or bald misstatements of the law are of
course my own.
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